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THE JUDICIAL NOMINATION PROCESS
SENATOR CHARLES E. GRASSLEY*
The judicial nomination process, including the Senate's role to
"advise and consent," works well in the vast majority of cases.
When a lower court judgeship becomes available, the President, in
consultation with lawyers, members of Congress, and others,
nominates someone to fill the position. The Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the American Bar Association ("ABA") investigate
the nominee's background and abilities. The Senate Judiciary
Committee considers the nominee in a hearing as well as through
its own investigation. If no questions arise over the nominee's
qualifications or suitability for the bench, Committee approval is
generally followed by full Senate approval of the nominee. I be-
lieve that the result of this procedure in the vast majority of cases
is a very fine federal judiciary.
This process has not been followed in recent nominations to the
Supreme Court, however. Since 1986, the process has been badly
shaken and needs immediate reform. Any doubt as to this point
was dispelled by the most recent treatment of a Supreme Court
nominee, now-Justice Clarence Thomas. What has happened is
that special interest groups, accountable to no one, have been
formed specifically to deny the right of the President to choose
nominees that reflect his values. In the cases of Presidents Reagan
and Bush, the American people had been specifically asked to con-
sider the prospect of Supreme Court nominees when they cast
their votes (indeed, Jimmy Carter had raised the specter of Ron-
ald Reagan's appointing Justices as a reason why voters should re-
elect Carter).
The first whiff of trouble in the process came in 1986, when
Justice Rehnquist was nominated to be Chief Justice. Justice
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Rehnquist had developed a fine record as Associate Justice. There
was no question that he was well qualified to be Chief Justice.
However, a number of liberal groups were opposed to his eleva-
tion purely on political grounds. The precursors of what later was
to develop more fully began to emerge. To try and defeat the
nomination, the opposition groups raised whatever arguments
they could, regardless of logic. So, for instance, Justice Rehnquist
was attacked by these self-appointed guardians as being outside
the "judicial mainstream," despite the fact that the man nominat-
ing him had just carried forty-nine states less than two years ear-
lier. The evidence for their claim: Justice Rehnquist had written
more lone dissents than any other member of the Court. This was
a transparently specious charge. After all, the first Justice Harlan
dissented frequently. Justices Holmes and Brandeis also dissented
frequently. The free exchange of ideas was, until 1986, seen as a
virtue, and sometimes the force of history could vindicate earlier
dissents (interestingly, many of those who opposed Justice Rehn-
quist now criticize Justice Souter for nearly always joining the ma-
jority opinion and rarely writing separately, but I suppose that a
foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds).
The Rehnquist hearings also led to the efforts of a large num-
ber of people to find whatever minutiae from the Justice's entire
life that they might use against the Rehnquist nomination. For in-
stance, someone actually looked up and examined the deed to Jus-
tice Rehnquist's home in Phoenix. The restrictive clause con-
tained in the deed was offered as conclusive proof of Justice
Rehnquist's prejudice, notwithstanding the fact that such clauses
had been rendered unenforceable nearly forty years before and
that there was no evidence that he had even read the deed. Al-
though the nomination itself was never really in doubt, the thirty-
three votes cast against Justice Rehnquist were the largest number
ever received by a successful nominee up to that time. The hand-
writing was on the wall. Fortunately, the attention was focused ex-
clusively on Justice Rehnquist's nomination. Although Justice
Scalia is also conservative, the groups did not attack his nomina-
tion, and he was approved by a unanimous vote. The nomination
of Antonin Scalia today would have resulted in a bloody battle;
the nation might have lost the service of one of the most intelli-
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gent, forceful, and original Justices of our time.
By 1987, the Senate was in Democratic hands and Ronald Rea-
gan had been weakened by Iran-Contra. Another Supreme Court
vacancy arose. Although Senator Biden had earlier stated that if
the President nominated Robert Bork to a vacancy he would have
no choice but to support Bork, when that scenario actually arose,
the situation was said to have changed. Because Judge Bork had
been nominated to replace Justice Powell, a moderate swing vote,
the Senate, it was said, could consider ideology. For the first time
in our history, ideology was explicitly used as a basis to reject a
nominee. I can here only briefly discuss the perversion of the con-
firmation process and its transformation into a political smear
campaign. There were horribly inaccurate television commercials.
From the moment of his nomination, there were false accusations
made on the Senate floor about Judge Bork's views.
The fact was that Judge Bork was one of the finest nominations
in the history of our country. He is a man of uncommon talent
and distinguished scholarship in many areas of constitutional law.
His views of antitrust law had changed the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the issue to one much more soundly based in economic
reality. Once again, the pressure groups' main charge was that
Judge Bork was "outside the mainstream," notwithstanding the
fact that the Supreme Court had on several occasions quoted his
opinions verbatim in its own, and that he had never been reversed
by the Supreme Court in five years on the Court of Appeals. The
ABA, despite Judge Bork's obvious qualifications, let ideology in-
trude into its evaluation of the nomination. Despite Judge Bork's
brilliant and forthright testimony, and the seminar in constitu-
tional law he provided us all, the interest groups were able to de-
feat him. This happened only after legions of investigators had
invaded his privacy, including checking which videos he had
rented. Ironically, some of these same groups had criticized Judge
Bork's supposedly restrictive view of First Amendment freedoms
and the right to privacy. The Senate's handling of the Bork nomi-
nation was a sad affair for our country. The process had been
politicized to what was then considered the breaking point. And
what did these groups gain? Ultimately, Justice Kennedy's voting
record has been very similar to what we can with confidence state
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Judge Bork's would have been. However, I believe that what these
groups gained was a feeling of invincibility; that the President
would have to pay attention to who they believed were acceptable
nominees to the Supreme Court or risk defeat. They believed that
they had a right to determine who would be acceptable Supreme
Court Justices.
Three years later, Ju'stice Brennan retired. To counter the at-
tacks by the interest groups, President Bush took an approach
similar to that of President Cleveland after he had difficulty in
having a nominee confirmed: Bush nominated an unknown, then-
Judge Souter. There was no trail for investigators to scrutinize.
Although a handful of negative votes were cast, Justice Souter was
confirmed without much difficulty. But recognizing that they
could not defeat such nominees, the Judiciary Committee Demo-
crats warned President Bush not to send up another "stealth"
nominee.
And in 1991, upon the retirement of Justice Marshall, the Presi-
dent did not disappoint them. He nominated Judge Clarence
Thomas, a threat to the very existence of the liberal interest
groups. For here was a man who offered African-Americans an
alternative to dependency on the paternalism of government,
which was the prime message of the civil rights groups and liberal
Democrats on these issues. The groups were not about to take
that threat lying down. Working closely with Judiciary Committee
staff members, they dug and dug to find any dirt that they could
use to block the nomination. The media was only too happy to try
to find a killer fact as well.
At the "real" confirmation hearings, the nominee did not act as
Judge Bork had done. Like Justice Souter and all other nominees
who testified before the Judiciary Committee, Judge Thomas de-
clined to give answers to specific questions on many controversial
issues of the day. In spite of the tradition that prior nominees not
take positions on issues that could come before the Court-both
on the grounds of fairness to litigants and separation of pow-
ers-the liberal Democrats were angered. They seemed to have
forgotten that just ten years earlier, it was they who rose to pro-
tect nominee Sandra Day O'Connor from having to answer ques-
tions about abortion-put to her by conservatives who were con-
Vol. 7: 31, 1991
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cerned that she was sympathetic to Roe v. Wade.' And, they failed
to recall the nomination of Thurgood Marshall himself-who re-
fused to answer questions about the validity of Miranda v. Ari-
zona,2 then an anathema to conservatives. It was Senator Edward
Kennedy who forcefully championed Marshall's responsibility not
to answer specific questions:
I believe it is recognized by most Senators that we are not
charged with the responsibility of approving a man to be As-
sociate Justice of the Supreme Court only if his views always
coincide with our own. We are not seeking a nominee for the
Supreme Court who will express the majority view of the
Senate on every given issue, or on a given issue of fundamen-
tal importance. We are really interested in knowing whether
the nominee has the background, experience, qualifications,
temperament, and integrity to handle this most sensitive, im-
portant, and responsible job.3
So ignoring decades of history in the confirmation process,
Committee Democrats sought to pin Judge Thomas down to spe-
cifics. They scrutinized his paper record. Judge Thomas was asked
to respond to quotations taken out of context from speeches he
had given long ago. What purpose did this serve? Had he agreed
with the statements, he would have been pilloried for the sub-
stance of his beliefs. Had he changed them, he would have been
accused of a "confirmation conversion." As it was, he was criti-
cized as not believable when he said that those were political state-
ments which would have no bearing on his role as a Justice. In any
case, Judge Thomas answered hundreds of questions over a five-
day period, more concerning specific topics than any other prior
nominee. Yet, many members seemed not to care about his an-
swers. When it came time for their floor statements, they relied
on the out of context quotations as if they had never had an op-
portunity to ask Judge Thomas about them. What is the point of
having overly lengthy hearings (Justice White was asked eight
questions in his 1962 confirmation hearings) if his answers are not
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
113 CONG. REC. 24,647 (1967).
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going to be considered?
This time, the nominee's opponents did not hesitate to opine
that their role was equally important as the President's in choos-
ing nominees. Balance was essential on the Court, it was said, even
though no liberal had argued in 1967 that a conservative was
needed to balance the most liberal Court ever. Prior Presidents, it
was said, had appointed Justices of the opposite party to the Su-
preme Court, and President Bush had an obligation to do the
same. These Senators neglected to mention that Presidents Ken-
nedy and Johnson had only appointed Democrats to the Supreme
Court, all of whom had served in their administrations or were
close personal friends. They also failed to realize that even those
Presidents that had appointed Justices of different political affilia-
tion did so because of the potential political advantages, such as
nominating a Republican Chief Justice, Harlan F. Stone, as the
nation was about to join World War II, or an Irish-Catholic Dem-
ocrat, William Brennan, appointed three weeks before the 1956
election. Those appointments were not made because the Presi-
dent felt compelled to appoint Justices with the idea of "balance"
in mind. But it was probably too much to ask these opponents of
Judge Thomas to rely only on rational argument. For they knew
that voters had shut them out of the political branches. Their only
hope was that unelected judges would continue the liberal agenda
through judicial activism. That's what was at stake in the Thomas
nomination. And as we ultimately learned, they would go to any
lengths to sink the nomination.
A few days before the confirmation vote was scheduled, it was
clear to all that Judge Thomas would be confirmed, notwithstand-
ing the campaign launched against his nomination. Most of the
opponents were resigned to the fact that they had been beaten.
But some would simply not allow a nominee opposed by civil
rights and labor groups to be appointed to the Supreme Court.
We know what happened. The unholy alliance of some Senate
staffers, the liberal interest groups, and the media struck again.
Staffers encouraged Professor Anita Hill to come forward with al-
legations of sexual harassment by Judge Thomas. Ultimately, she
did so, but only on the condition of confidentiality. Since the-
charges were anonymous, Chairman Biden quite properly con-
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cluded that they could not be publicly investigated. However, the
charges were taken very seriously, as evidenced by the FBI investi-
gation that he ordered. The results of the investigation, although
inconclusive, were made available to the Democratic members of
the Committee (although not all Republicans) before the vote.
Any member could have delayed the vote pending further investi-
gation. No one felt that the evidence warranted delay. But one
member or staffer knew that the mere existence of the allegations,
regardless of their validity, might be sufficient to kill the nomina-
tion. So despite the promised confidentiality to Professor Hill, the
member or staffer, directly or through one of the advocacy
groups, leaked the contents of a confidential statement or perhaps
the FBI report to the media. The media was only too happy to
report it, notwithstanding the invasion of privacy to both Profes-
sor Hill and Judge Thomas, presumably because they felt that the
information could block the nomination. As I said on the floor at
the time, the treatment of Judge Thomas was the worst I had seen
of any nominee in my eleven years in the Senate.
The media continued to be an active participant in the confir-
mation process when it ran stories that the Judiciary Committee's
decision to vote rather than investigate showed that it did not take
allegations of sexual harassment seriously. Charges flew that had
there been a female member of the Committee, the vote would
have certainly been delayed. The issue was turned into men versus
women, providing a convenient forum for the liberal women's
groups to rail against male insensitivity to sexual harassment. A
full Committee investigation was demanded, and the floor vote
was delayed when it became apparent that the votes to confirm
might well be inadequate.
What happened in the few days beginning with the leak was a
national disgrace. Senate rules and the law itself may have been
violated by the leak of this information. Two individuals were
harmed irreparably. Congress was harmed as well, because its in-
vestigations would be compromised if future witnesses refused to
cooperate because they simply could not rely on promises of confi-
dentiality. The media was captured by individuals using a terrible
charge both as a smear to wreck a nomination and to further
broad ideological concerns of sexual harassment regardless of the
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validity of the facts in this case. The issue was not whether sexual
harassment is a terrible offense, but whether there was actual evi-
dence that sexual harassment had occurred to Professor Hill, two
very distinct questions. The claim that the Judiciary Committee
had not taken Professor Hill's allegations seriously was repeated
over and over. But the Committee did respond. Launching an FBI
investigation was a serious response, and one far more likely to
discover the truth of the situation than any hearings the Judiciary
Committee could hold. Subsequent events proved that. Given the
promises of confidentiality, there was no better way to have han-
dled the allegations. But perception overcame reality, and the re-
sult was a postponed floor vote to be preceded by Judiciary Com-
mittee hearings concerning issues of possible sexual harassment
committed by Judge Thomas.
I was disgusted with the breakdown of the process that led to
the second set of hearings. I was sickened by the explicit testi-
mony that was televised coast to coast, often at hours when chil-
dren may have been watching. I was horrified with the effect that
these allegations and their public discussion had on Judge Thomas
and Professor Hill. And despite it all, the Judiciary Commit-
tee-ill-suited to conducting a factual inquiry of this nature-still
could not finally determine whether the allegations were true. In
the highly unusual circumstances the Judiciary Committee found
itself in, Chairman Biden was correct in instructing us, as well as
the American people, that doubts-and the hearings raised many
more questions than they answered-had to be resolved in favor
of Judge Thomas, the accused in this situation.
The Thomas hearings have shown that the confirmation pro-
cess for Supreme Court Justices must be reformed. First, the Sen-
ate must realize that the President has the right to nominate his
choices for Supreme Court Justices, and that Presidents will tend
to choose nominees who share their judicial philosophy. Nominees
should not be rejected for their philosophy unless they would seek
to undermine basic rules of American jurisprudence, such as over-
turning Marbury v. Madison4 or Brown v. Board of Education," or if
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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they advocated other forms of judicial activism inconsistent with
the sphere of representative government. This approach is what
Alexander Hamilton described in the Federalist papers, in which
he stated that the function of advise and consent was to prevent
the President from appointing cronies or political hacks.
Second, the Judiciary Committee hearings should be shorter
and concentrate on the overall qualifications of a judicial nominee
rather than on his or her responses to questions about a few con-
stitutional issues. We ought to start treating the confirmation of a
Justice for what it is rather than debating the political issues of the
day, issues that will be supplanted by others over the life tenure of
a Justice. Nominees should not be subjected to the inquisitions en-
dured by Judge Bork and Justice Thomas.
Third, the Senate should recognize that it will never be consid-
ering a perfect human being as a Supreme Court nominee. Staff,
advocacy groups, and the media should respect the nominee's pri-
vacy, rather than look for any information they can find that
could be used to derail a nomination. While it is very important
that nominees to such an important lifetime position be thor-
oughly investigated, there are limits that should be adhered to.
My fear is that after seeing what has happened to decent people
like Judge Bork and Justice Thomas during the confirmation
hearing, good people will be deterred from aspiring to important
government positions. I am also concerned that Presidents, fear-
ing that their nominees will be chewed up and spit out, will re-
frain from appointing the best available people for a job, for often
the best available people have taken positions on some issues that
certain Senators may not like. The Senate must remember that it
is not its job to select the nominee. During the Thomas process,
the Senate and others forgot that fact, and acted unfairly and con-
trary to their professed principles. The results of that conduct
were disastrous. I hope that no nominee, the Senate, or the Amer-
ican people ever have to go through another confirmation process
like the one we have just completed. We can and must do better.

